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Failed software development projects are expensive for society and individual companies. Studies 
indicate defects in requirements specification are the cause of many of these failures. A large 
financial services company recently implemented a software requirements inspection process 
based on the Fagan model with the assistance of the authors. Subsequently, the process was re-
invented by users to be less formal, and the organization changed the official process to be 
consistent with the new process to encourage institutionalization. This change formed a natural 
experiment. The authors examined inspection documentation under both versions of the process to 
determine if there were any significant differences in the effectiveness of the versions or their 
implementation. They found that unplanned implementation effects of the new approach made it 
impossible to determine whether it was more effective than the original approach. Policy 
implications are discussed.  
 




Enormous resources are devoted to software development, with much of the effort being wasted. According to the 
CHAOS Report (Standish, 1994),  
In the United States, we spend more than $250 billion each year on IT application development…The 
Standish Group research shows a staggering 31.1% of projects will be canceled before they ever get 
completed. Further results indicate 52.7% of projects will cost 189% of their original estimates…The lost 
opportunity costs are not measurable, but could easily be in the trillions of dollars…The Standish Group 
estimates that in 1995 American companies and government agencies will spend $81 billion for canceled 
software projects. These same organizations will pay an additional $59 billion for software projects that 
will be completed, but will exceed their original time estimates. 
These results are consistent with earlier and later studies. E.g., a recent study (Hayes, 2004) found that “Only 28% 
of IT projects succeed these days, down from 34% a year or two ago. Outright failures – IT projects canceled before 
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completion – are up to 18% from 15%. The remaining 51% of IT projects are ‘challenged’ – seriously late, over 
budget and lacking expected features.” 
According to CIO Magazine, “as many as 71 percent of software projects that fail do so because of poor 
requirements management, making it the single biggest reason for project failure – bigger than bad technology, 
missed deadlines or change management fiascoes.” (Lindquist, 2005) A Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering 
Institute study states that “authoritative studies have shown that requirements engineering defects cost 10 to 200 
times as much to correct once fielded than if they were detected during requirements development…. The total 
percentage of project budget due to requirements defects is 25 to 40 percent.” (Mead, n.d.) 
While some progress is being made using methodologies that focus on defect prevention rather than defect removal 
(e.g., “Clean Room” [Carnegie Mellon, n.d.]), development of quality software will require effective methods for 
software defect identification and removal for the foreseeable future.  
Inspection and other Formal Technical Review (FTR) techniques are preferable to testing for software defect 
identification and removal since they can be implemented early in the development lifecycle, do not require 
executable code, and are an effective way to improve the development process. For an organization that has not 
previously inspected requirements, adding such a process represents a significant software process innovation (SPI). 
Diffusion research is utilized in this study because it provides insights into the adoption, implementation, and 
institutionalization processes for innovations, including SPIs. (E.g., Fichman and Kemerer, 1999) This paper 
examines one aspect of the deployment and institutionalization of an SPI in a large financial services organization. 
Theory 
In the diffusion literature, institutionalization is a measure of “the degree to which an innovation continues to be 
used after initial efforts to secure adoption is completed.” (Rogers, 2003) Institutionalization is positively related to 
“the degree to which an innovation is re-invented (defined … as the degree to which an innovation is modified by 
adopters as it diffuses) …  When an organization’s members change an innovation as they adopt it, they begin to 
regard it as their own, and are more likely to continue it over time, even when the initial special resources are 
withdrawn or diminish.” (Rogers, 2003)  
Perspectives on re-invention vary. Adopters generally view re-invention positively and may even overemphasize the 
amount of re-invention implemented. (Rice and Rogers, 1980). Rogers (2003) notes that 
At least some implementation problems are likely to be created by individuals or organizations, so adopters 
of an innovation almost always attempt to make changes in the original innovation to fit their situation 
better.  
Re-invention can be beneficial to adopters of an innovation. Flexibility in the process of adopting an 
innovation may reduce mistakes and encourage customization of the innovation to fit it more appropriately 
to local and/or changing conditions. As a result of re-invention, an innovation may be more appropriate in 
matching an adopter’s preexisting problems and more responsive to new problems that arise during the 
innovation-decision process. 
To the degree that re-invention encourages institutionalization, it is generally considered to be good. 
However, research and development agencies generally view re-invention negatively since it may lead to reduced 
effectiveness. “Some designers of an innovation structure a new idea so that it is particularly difficult to re-invent … 
Diffusion agencies may also be unfavorable toward re-invention, feeling that they know best as to the form of the 
innovation that users should adopt.” (Rogers, 2003) 
This research examines the effect of re-invention on the effectiveness of the requirements inspection process at the 
financial organization studied. 
Hypotheses 
One would expect any major change (re-invention) in the requirements inspection process methodology would have 
a significant effect on the effectiveness of that process. We examine two measures of process effectiveness: (1) 
number of critical or high defects found per page, and (2) the number of process errors. Critical and high defects are 
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utilized because of their generally disproportionate effects on the system; defects per requirements page are used to 
scale for differences in project size. Process errors are defined as defect tracking sheets filled out inconsistently or 
incorrectly; these errors are considered a (negative) measure of effectiveness since an error with no or an incorrect 
indication as to its cause, seriousness, etc. is more difficult to allocate resources for than one that is properly 
specified. Conversations with organization representatives indicated that they expected the change from the formal 
to the more informal process would be at least neutral in its effects on effectiveness. Stated as nulls, our hypotheses 
are as follows: 
H1: There is no significant difference between the formal and informal reviews in the number of serious 
(defined as critical or high) defects found per page. 
H2: There is no significant difference between the formal and informal reviews in the number of process errors 
per defect sheet.  
Method 
Background 
In 2003, the first author (then a graduate student in the second author’s class) asked the second author for advice in 
implementing a requirements inspection program at the major financial services company where he then worked. 
This led to some informal consulting during which the second author made suggestions and critiqued materials 
developed by the first author. The new requirements inspection program was instituted at the beginning of 2004. The 
process developed was fairly strict and implemented some of the more formal structures of the Fagan Inspection, 
such as independent moderators and formal meetings. Internally, the process was simply called the “Formal 
Review.” 
At the beginning of 2005, the review process changed.  Less emphasis was placed on the formal elements 
(moderator, documentation, etc.), and process users were allowed to focus on quickly moving through the process 
vs. keeping the process elements pure.  The intent was to address employee feedback that had stated that the more 
formal elements were not effective and were a waste of time. By this time, the first author had changed employment 
and the second author was no longer involved. 
In mid-2005, the authors contacted the organization looking for a real-world research project. In the ensuing 
discussions, it was decided that an objective examination of the deployment and institutionalization of the 
requirements inspection process would be useful to the organization and had the potential to provide data for several 
studies. (A second, related study is now in process.)  
Analysis 
Review documentation for five software projects, each with multiple subprojects, was analyzed. For each 
subproject, we recorded the number of pages and the number of defects in each severity type and class. We also 
noted the number of process errors found per defect sheet. 
Results 
Critical and High Defects 
Prior to the process change instituted at the beginning of 2005, the requirements inspection process averaged 0.699 
serious defects found per page of requirements. After the process change, this number increased 1.149 defects per 
page. To test the statistical significance of the difference in the means of the two processes, several statistical tests 
were performed. One of the assumptions for parametric statistics is that the variances for the two samples are equal. 
The 95% Bonferroni confidence intervals for the formal and informal samples are 0.384, 0.872 and 0.958, 2.767 
respectively; since these intervals do not overlap, equal variances cannot be assumed. Two nonparametric tests, 
Mann-Whitney and Kruskall-Wallis, both showed p = 1.0 (adjusted for ties). So, while the means suggest there is a 
difference in the effectiveness of the two processes in detecting critical and high defects, the difference is not 
statistically significant and H1 cannot be rejected. 
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Table 1. Analysis of Serious Defects by Inspection Type 
Defect Type Inspection 
Type 
 









Formal Formal 01 1 7 37 0.216 0.699 0.537 
 Formal 02   4 0.000   
 Formal 03 5 14 16 1.188   
 Formal 04 1 10 15 0.733   
 Formal 05 9 21 15 2.000   
 Formal 06  10 10 1.000   
 Formal 07 4 12 30 0.533   
 Formal 08 1 4 8 0.625   
 Formal 09  7 12 0.583   
 Formal 10  1 13 0.077   
 Formal 11 2 20 20 1.100   
 Formal 12 1 4 9 0.556   
 Formal 13  4 10 0.400   
 Formal 14  6 17 0.353   
 Formal 15  10 68 0.147   
 Formal 16 1 30 20 1.550   
 Formal 17 3 38 50 0.820   
Informal Informal 01 1 2 9 0.333 1.149 1.440 
 Informal 02  2 9 0.222   
 Informal 03 3 5 2 4.000   
 Informal 04 1 7 5 1.600   
 Informal 05  6 88 0.068   
 Informal 06  6 87 0.069   
 Informal 07  6 6 1.000   
 Informal 08  3 4 0.750   
 Informal 09 8 57 17 3.824   
 Informal 10 3 23 50 0.520   
 Informal 11 1 4 20 0.250   
 Note: Page counts in italics are estimated 
Process Errors 
Proper use of defect sheets declined after the new process was put into effect.  Under the less formal (2005) 
requirements inspection process, the percentage of process errors per defect sheet rose from 2.529 per review to 
15.182. Since the p-value for Levene’s Test for the two distributions is 0.060, parametric statistics are not 
appropriate. A Mann-Whitney Test indicated the two distributions are not equal at the 0.0030 level (0.0018 adjusted 
for ties). Hypothesis H2 is therefore rejected. 
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Formal Formal 01 2 43 2.529 8.903 
 Formal 02 0    
 Formal 03 0    
 Formal 04 0    
 Formal 05 0    
 Formal 06 0    
 Formal 07 0    
 Formal 08 0    
 Formal 09 1    
 Formal 10 0    
 Formal 11 1    
 Formal 12 1    
 Formal 13 0    
 Formal 14 37    
 Formal 15 0    
 Formal 16 0    
 Formal 17 1    
Informal Informal 01 0 167 15.182 19.323 
 Informal 02 6    
 Informal 03 0    
 Informal 04 11    
 Informal 05 56    
 Informal 06 17    
 Informal 07 3    
 Informal 08 4    
 Informal 09 6    
 Informal 10 15    
 Informal 11 49    
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study shows that re-invention by users of the requirements inspection process may have had mixed effects. Re-
invention, while perhaps positive in improving process institutionalization (the subject of another study), had 
negative consequences for the proper completion of defect sheets and (presumably) in their usefulness in allocating 
resources for defect correction. Whether the informal process improved serious defect detection effectiveness is 
unclear, as is the overall effect of the process change. 
There are a number of limitations to this study. 
The data are such that parametric statistical techniques are not appropriate, and the number of projects/subprojects is 
too small to allow H1 to be rejected using nonparametric approaches. It is recommended that documentation for 
additional projects/subprojects be made available by the organization so that more meaningful statistical analysis is 
possible.  
The study examines one set of projects for one organization. While conversations with organization representatives 
give no reason to believe these projects are atypical, without random sampling, generalization to the organization is 
problematical. Whether the results can be generalized beyond the organization is even more problematical. These 
are, of course, usual problems with any case-type research. 
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If the informal process is actually more effective (as suggested by the results) in detecting serious defects, this may 
be due to greater “buy in” by reviewers. An alternative explanation would be that there were more defects to be 
found during the informal process period due to other changes in development processes; conversations with 
organization representatives indicate this explanation is improbable, but it cannot be excluded at this time. As actual 
defects are found in the various systems studied, it may be possible to calculate defect densities and exclude this 
possibility. Of course, the apparent change in effectiveness may be a statistical artifact. 
Finally, this study should be understood as being the first in what is hoped will be a series of case-type studies using 
a variety of methods. The second study is currently in process. 
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